Discussion: The Spirit of Utopia by Giles-Peters, A
Discussion
The spirit of utopia
“Communism is the positive  abolition of private pro­
perty • • •” wrote Marx over a century ago. By this he did 
not mean merely that the relations of production would 
be changed in that capitalists would no longer own and 
control the means of production. The state or the people 
would not own anything. In fact nobody would own any­
thing- T he very notion of ownership would not even exist. 
Why? Because the conditions in which the notions of 
"ownership” and “private property” could be applicable 
would have been overcome. A framework in which “private” 
versus “public”, inequality vies with equality and ownership 
struggles with non-ownership would have been superseded.
Thus revolution reaches far beyond the removal of private 
property in the external reality. It requires the abolition of 
private property and its ramifications in our "internal real­
ities”, that is, intrapsychically, and in our interpersonal 
relations. Revolutionaries must not only smash the external 
state structure, but must overcome the enormous effects on 
their own as well as others’ being of their socialisation since 
birth. Women’s liberationists are aware of this: How can a 
revolutionary eulogize workers’ control during the day and 
beat his wife up at night? The overcoming of external 
oppression can have no meaning without the correlative 
resolution of its counterpart in oppressive personal rela­
tionships. T he people of a new society would no longer see 
themselves and others as manipulable objects.
When society is viewed as a totality, the divisions into 
classes by no means exhaust the description of it. The 
society may be founded on one group owning the means 
of production while others work them, but this does not 
explain the operation  of the society. The on-going system 
is legitimized and perpetuated by means of the promotion of 
ways of life through mystification and the consequent accept­
ance of these definitions of reality both consciously and, at 
a deeper-level, unconsciously by the mass of the people. The 
relations of production are constantly reproduced in daily 
life-activity. Although there is some overt state repression 
of dissenters, the system is basically preserved culturally.
For present purposes, I shall make a rough distinction 
between what I shall call “structural” and “cultural” com­
ponents of the present system of domination. Structural 
components include the relations of production (in the 
classical marxist sense), the state-system which encompasses 
parliament and government, the courts, prisons and the 
police, the public service and the military — in general the 
direct organs of state power. The "cultural” includes the 
actual ways of life of people; their modes of living and 
thinking; their needs, values, aspirations and view of the 
constitution of reality. It also includes the mass media, the 
education system, political and religious ideologies and the
Marxists have tended to concentrate on the structural 
aspects of capitalism to the virtual exclusion of the cultural 
ones. The use of the old base-superstructure model has 
reflected and further facilitated this emphasis — the base 
emg “below” and therefore more fundamental. The im­
portance of the structural aspects cannot be denied, and it 
would be mistaken to believe that capitalism was not sliding 
trom one economic crisis into another. T o  maintain that 
here is little state repression of those who protest the system 
would be to fly in the face of the facts too. Any analysis
Present society and its future in terms of revolutionary 
transformation must take adequate account of structural 
Actors.
However I am not claiming only that cultural factors 
have been hitherto neglected and should be considered as 
well as structural ones — although this in itself is true 
enough. I want to maintain that the cultural factors are 
the more important ones to be considered so far as a revolu­
tionary strategy is concerned. I  believe the only v iable  
revolutionary approach to be one which sees revolution 
primarily as cultural revolution.
Revolution- centrally involves transcendence. If the new 
society is not to be the old one in different dress, the trans­
cendence must be total, including the transformation of forms 
of life. This means new men with new needs, goals, visions 
and perceptions. These men must come from somewhere. 
If they are to emerge anywhere, they must exist, at least 
embryonically, in the old society. They may be embryonic 
because even if they are not able to live in a totally new way 
(it would be amazing if they could given the extreme violence 
of socialization), they have the general form and direction 
of free men. These embryonic new men are transitional in 
that they are stationed neither in the old society which they 
physically inhabit, nor in the new society which does not yet 
exist. They stand with feet in both. They are in capitalist 
society, but not of it; they are o f  the new society but not in 
it. Obviously these people cannot arise from the study of 
the critique of political economy which reinforces the 
schizoid dualism of intellect and emotion, a dichotomy which 
is so pervasive under modern capitalist domination. That 
is, a theory which allows mainly for structural analyses and 
ignores the experiencing involved in intra- and inter-personal 
life is inconsistent with the development of the new man 
whose new needs are based precisely on his sensitivity to 
experiencing.
For the most part people living in our society live un­
thinking, automatic lives of pre-structured routine. They 
have internalized the norms of the society and often seek 
after the goals which are those of capitalism itself. Their 
lives are directed from outside — whether through what 
they feel is expected of them by “society” via the mass media, 
by their employers, or in their roles as husband, wife, public 
servant, “good bloke”, etc. Their lives are conditioned by a 
hostile, authoritarian environment which began violating 
their individuality far further back than they can even 
remember.
In such circumstances, how can revolutionary strategies 
fashioned around what I have termed structural factors (e.g. 
imminent economic crises, the right to strike) transform 
basic attitudes towards living? Certainly, economic crises can, 
for example, precipitate some awareness of the hopeless 
state of capitalism (although the effects in this direction 
may not be lasting ones), but they normally provoke enchant­
ment with reform rather than revolution. At best, structural 
factors may help to create better conditions for the possibility 
of the awakening of revolutionary consciousness among the 
masses. People under advanced capitalism are generally 
wedded to the system which often provides the (material) 
benefits it promises, and they would prefer to patch it up 
rather than overthrow it. It goes further than this of course 
because the deep roots of their being are also the values of 
capitalism. Revolutionary transformation of the system itself 
is viewed as impossible, but reform is not. Elastic capitalism 
can accommodate a great many changes in it without alter­
ing its basic structure, but providing the illusion of progress.
Given this situation, a revolutionary strategy will aim at 
demonstrating the possibility of other modes of existence. 
Freedom will be articulated through a counter-culture which 
uses human possibility as the measuring rod for what is. 
T hat is, the new society which must emerge from historical 
possibility (which is not to be confused with what is com­
monly regarded as practicable) is to be the standard of 
judgment. Utopia, the society which is not and is not-yet 
should be the motor of present practice. This means that 
new forms of living should be attempted within the present 
society.
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If it is objected that this is impossible, some points may be 
made in reply. First, it may not be impossible at all. We 
may have been conditioned through the capitalist definition 
of reality to regard any transformation of the system as im­
possible. The French students in 1968 upset the established 
definition of reality by living alternate definitions: “Be 
realistic. Demand the impossible." What is called utopian 
may be historical possibility. Further, success should not 
be gauged solely in terms of whether or not a structure is 
seized. For example, there are those who view the France 
1968 events as a failure because the government regained 
power. These people do not see the importance of the 
activity of the students in terms of a real breakthrough in 
the sense of a glimmer of new life. Revolution is a slow 
process and events such as those of France 1968 must be 
seen as foundational.
Cultural revolution must be permanent, not episodic. 
The fact that it involves ways of life incompatible with the 
present system involves a commitment of revolutionaries to 
other values. This life would be freer, more authentic and 
real than life which accepts the norms of the present system.
The last decade has seen the beginnings of cultural revolu­
tion. There is a long way to go in bringing about counter- 
cultuie which is genuinely outside the system. But when 
this counter-culture gathers mass support, the system will 
be immobilised. This is not to ignore the armed force of 
the state. However, it is only on the basis of a refusal of 
the system by the masses of people that it is possible to 
combat the state-system.
Cultural transformation is total transcendence. What is 
most needed today for such transformation is the spirit of 
utopia.
D o u g l a s  K ir s n e r
Marxism and anarchism
If the Article by Alastair Davidson (“Marxism and Anarch­
ism”) in A LR  Nov. 1971 had been called “Marx against 
Stirner” and if it had not confused the views of Stirner with 
those of anarchists generally, then one would not bother to 
make a reply unless one was a partisan of Stirner's. A defence 
of Stirner could be made along the lines of showing the 
degree to which his critique of Feuerbach was similar to 
Marx’s — and may in fact have influenced Marx — and 
the degree to which his discussion of the place of the pro­
letariat in bourgeois society was in line with Marx’s ideas.
I will not bother with this — the interested reader will find 
discussions in Hook’s From  H egel to Marx and McLellan’s 
T he Young H egelians and Karl Marx; my interest is in 
anarchism rather than in Stirner.
When a political journal publishes an article on a philos­
opher who was, at best, obscure in his own time and is 
even more so today, one wonders just what the political 
intention is. Now it may well be that Davidson is merely 
interested in the fact that "marxism was partly worked out 
in a critique of Stirner”, but it seems much more likely that 
the real intention is to show (in his words) that:
“ . . . this disagreement (viz. the one between Stirner 
and Marx) shows an early disagreement between Marx 
and the men who were later known as anarchists, dis­
crediting the idea that the dispute between marxists and 
anarchists is merely over practical matters like centralised 
control (authoritarianism), and the corresponding idea, 
sometimes bruited (e.g. by Guerin) that anarchism is 
merely marxist socialism without the central control. 
Marxism is an anti-anarchism.”
Assuming that this is the real thesis of the article -  
obviously a politically relevant one — can anything be said 
in support of it?
The first point against the thesis is that, for Stirner, 
anarchism is a deduction from an extreme philosophical
egoism which also implies an anti-social as well as an anti- 
state position. (The Stirnerian “union of egoists” is not so 
much a society as a Hobbesian “state of nature”). Marx, 
himself no friend of the State, was concerned to attack the 
egoist premises and the anti-social conclusions; this does not 
touch on anarchism proper which does not preach revolt 
against society as such but just its class forms. For instance 
Bakunin says:
“Society, preceding in time any development of human­
ity . . . , constitutes the very essence of human existence.”
“A radical revolt by man against' society would therefore 
be just as impossible as a revolt against Nature, human 
society being nothing else but the last great manifestation 
or creation of Nature upon this earth. And an individual 
who would want to rebel against society, that is, against 
Nature in general and his own nature in particular, 
would place himself beyond the pale of real existence, 
would plunge into nothingness, into an absolute void, 
into lifeless abstraction, into God.”
The second point is that although Stirner reached anarchist 
conclusions (among others) from egoist premises it by no 
means follows that the historical anarchist movement, the 
movement of Bakunin, Kropotkin and Malatesta, was ever 
dependent on these premises. Far from anarchism depending 
on “an absolute notion of Man as an egoist and an individual 
who was oppressed by social fetters” Bakunin was to say:
“Man is so much a social animal that it is impossible to 
think of him apart from society.”
“The point of view of the idealists is altogether different. 
In their system man is first produced as an immortal and 
free being and ends up by becoming a slave. As a free 
and immortal being, infinite and complete in himself, he 
does not stand in need of society.”
. . . the individual, his freedom and reason, are the 
products of society, and not vice versa . . .”
Even if Stirner’s basic philosophical position was “an ab­
solute notion of Man as an egoist and individual oppressed 
by social fetters” it by no means follows, or even is true, that 
other philosophical anarchists must hold this position. (Rev­
olutionary anarchists don’t anyway.) The most recent work, 
Robert Paul W olff’s In D efense o f  Anarchism, is entirely 
independent of egoism and argues for philosophical anarch­
ism by refuting the arguments for the sovereignty of the 
state put up by bourgeois democratic theorists.
The fact is that Stirner’s position was his own (or “his 
Own” if you like) only and died with him except for a hand­
ful of American individualist anarchists who were a minority 
even within the movement in the U.S.A. Although he is of 
certain theoretical interest, and is sometimes read for this 
reason today, he did not influence the historical anarchist 
movement and would be unknown today except for the ef­
forts of non-anarchists compilers of anthologies of “anarch­
ism”. (The notion that T h e Ego and its Own was a bible of 
the actual anarchist movement is completely laughable. 
Stirner was “Saint Max” only to Marx.) It remains then to 
ask whether Marx, as well as showing that “anarchist” egoism 
— like any egoism — must, if consistent, lead to an elitist and 
tyrannical position, ever made any direct attack on the core 
ideas of anarchism
It seems not. Except for his attack on Proudhon’s con­
fused mixture of half-understood economics and dialectics 
(a mixture that embarrassed Bakunin as a friend of Proud­
hon’s and an ex-follower), it does not appear that Marx ever 
devoted a work, or part of a work, to attacking anarchism 
as such. For what could he attack apart from Stirner’s 
egoism and Proudhon’s confusion? In essence marxism and 
anarchism were in agreement. Both were revolutionary doc­
trines aiming at the overthrow of the state by the proletariat, 
the socialisation of the means of production and the aboli­
tion of the state together with class society. Their divergen­
cies were probably much smaller than the divisions which
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would later grow within them. Given that, contrary to Krim- 
merman and Perry, ‘‘St. Max” is a saint only to Marx and 
that his book is unread by most anarchists, what can be 
said against the proposition that anarchism is non-authoritar- 
ian, i.e. libertarian, socialism. Once anarchism is distin­
guished from philosophical egoism how can Marxism be 
called an "anti-anarchism”?
T o answer the last question first one remembers that Marx 
started from a criticism of the theory of the state as embo­
died Freedom or Reason in the abstract and proceeded to a 
criticism of the theory of the state as a supra-social mediator 
of social interests. For Marx the end of class society is the 
end of the state, i.e. the end of a social power separate from 
society. T o  conceal the obvious affinity of this with anarch­
ism “orthodox” marxists have pretended that anarchism 
inverts the relationship; that anarchists believe that the end 
of the state is the end of class society. This they can only 
do by neglecting the fact that for anarchism the destruction 
of the state is an act of revolution; the movement which 
destroys the state does so precisely because it is the over­
throw of the old class structure with its attendant relations 
of domination and subordination. Even this is not sufficient 
to make the difference between the supposed anarchist and 
supposed marxist positions; they had also to neglect the 
interpenetration of the State and Civil Society. Having thus 
destroyed the "dialectical” connections between base (civil 
society) and superstructure (state) and replaced them by 
a simple “cause” and “effect”, i.e. mechanical model, they 
could then believe that anarchists were not only undialectical 
(like themselves) but idealists as well because they believed 
that the superstructure determined the base. This vulgar- 
marxist criticism was all that one could expect from the 
degeneracy of the Second International; after Lenin’s State 
and R evolution  — a book denounced as “anarchist” by the 
orthodox — and the theoretical work of Korsch, Gramsci and 
Lukacs, it is much harder to see how it can be made. Marx­
ism denies the transcendental theory of the State; it locates 
the state in the context of class oppression; it looks forward 
to the end of the state; Marxism is thus an an-archism.
If marxism and anarchism agree in that they are both 
an-archist (Proudhon’s term), there are still futher similar­
ities. T he only anarchism which has played an historical role 
is collectivist anarchism (anti-individualist anarchism); Bak­
unin and his followers called themselves revolutionary 
socialists for years before “anarchists” came into general use 
for the movement. In terms of intellectual genesis both 
Bakunin and Marx were initially impressed by Proudhon, 
both rejected his mutualist economics and both rejected his 
reactionary tendencies, e.g. his anti-feminism. On a  philos­
ophical level anarchism is anti-idealist; some anarchists are 
historical materialists like Bakunin, some have been scientific 
materialists like Kropotkin and, being overly attached to the 
methodology of the physical sciences, have tended less 
towards marxist historical and economic science and more 
towards scientism. All anarchists worth speaking of, includ­
ing the "gentle” Kropotkin, have believed in the reality of 
class warfare. The central difference between Marx and the 
founder of the anarchist movement, Bakunin, was the im­
portance to the latter of the peasantry considered as a factor 
in the revolution and accordingly of methods of revolution 
in countries which had not fully developed bourgeois institu­
tions. This seems to reflect a "geographic” determinism; 
Bakunin was a Russian active in eastern and southern 
Europe, Marx was a German active in England.
Much is made of the so-called "fact” that marxists believe 
in organisation but anarchists don't. The real position is 
more complex. Marx attacked Bakunin for believing in the 
direction of the revolution by a conspiratorial movement. 
Marx himself believed in mass democratic organisations. 
This difference too flowed from a difference in revolution­
ary geography; Marx, in England, believed that a peaceful 
electoral transition to socialism was possible in the advanced 
capitalist countries. Bakunin was still mainly concerned with
Russia and the backward countries of eastern and southern 
Europe. What Marx, from his perspective, deplored in 
Bakunin, Steklov, Bakunin’s bolshevik biographer and his­
torian of the first International, was later to applaud and 
claim Bakunin as a proto-bolshevik. For his part Bakunin 
attacked Marx for the intention of maintaining the state 
after the revolution and solving transitional problems by the 
application of State power directed by experts (authoritar­
ianism) rather than by the initiative of the popular masKs 
(libertarianism). T o  be fair to Marx, Bakunin was probably 
unaware of Marx’s early analyses of bureaucracy and of his 
decision, after the Paris Commune, in favour of a form of 
revolutionary government little removed from Bakunin's own 
anarchism.
What then divides anarchists fom marxists? One might as 
well ask what divides marxists from marxists and anarchists 
from anarchists. It is not “merely” practical matters since 
disputes over practice are not separable from disputes over 
theory. Nor is it that anachism is marxism minus central 
control since "central control” may refer to the party before 
the revolution or to society after the revolution. It is 
known that anarchists have opposed the latter, but so have 
some leftwing marxists; on the former anarchists are them­
selves divided. (Of course if "central control” is further 
taken to mean hierarchical and bureaucratic organisation, 
then anarchists are definitely opposed.) Anarchists have 
always opposed party dictatorships, but then Marx himself 
was not committed to one.
* * *
In the above I have stressed similarities between marxism 
and anarchism. There are also differences, the main one 
being that whereas marxists claim scientific status for their 
doctrine anarchists merely claim that science supports their 
doctrine which at core appears to consist of an ethic of 
individual responsibility (quite the opposite of egoism). Not 
that anarchism would elaborate a system of ethics, of course! 
It is this ethical dimension of anarchism that lies behind 
the current “convergence”.
Every revolutionary movement needs an ethical dimension. 
This does not mean that revolutionary theory needs to be 
completed by an ethical theory, nor does it mean that 
revolutionaries should elaborate a morality; to do so would 
be to return to a pre-Marxian level, to forget the character­
isation of moralities as ideology. T he ethical dimension lies 
instead in the realm of practice, in the commitment of people 
to the movement. It is this that western marxism had lost 
in the change from commitment to the movement because 
of its goals to commitment to the movement as an organ­
isation by members who had no other commitments to fall 
back on.
In these circumstances the regeneration of the movement 
has come from outside. A new generation impelled predo­
minantly by an anarchist ethic (with a strong admixture of 
liberal outrage) has been the driving force of the recent 
explosions in the west .Although speaking the language of 
marxist analysis — and what other language is there for the 
expression of revolutionary critique? — the impulse has not 
come from claims to scientific status. Not initially at least.
One may have reservations about this development, one 
can question the stability of the commitment and the accur­
acy of the analysis, but unquestionably it is the only 
development of potentially revolutionary significance in the 
west since 1936. In this situation the study of the relations 
between marxism and anarchism, even unacknowledged an­
archism, becomes important and it is important that such 
a study be conducted responsibly. T o  pass off an attack 
on Stirner as a study of Marxism and Anarchism is not 
good enough. Until a study is done of Bakunin the question 
has not even been taken seriously and the first prerequisite 
of a serious study is the rejection of Engels’ remark that 
anarchism was merely a compound of Proudhon and Stirner.
A. R. G il e s -P e t e r s
L a t r o b e  U n iv e r s it y  P h il o s o p h y  D e p t .
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